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Taking the Temperature: EU Competition 
Law and Health Care
Johan van de Gronden and Wolf Sauter*
While the health-care sector grows in signifi cance due to social and technical developments, the European 
Union (EU) competition rules are likely to be more frequently applied to health care both as a result 
of the broad interpretation of the concept of undertaking and because, following the modernization of 
competition policy in 2003, the competition rules are also applied at the Member State level. This article 
charts how the case law is not always clear on the reconciliation of health-care objectives and competition 
rules. Hence, it pleads for soft law guidance in this area.
1. Introduction
Competition law and health care seem to come from two different worlds. Rivalry 
between providers and the need to cure patients may be believed to refl ect confl icting 
values. However, during the past decades, both the European courts and the Commis-
sion have been called upon to deal with competition law and health-care cases. These 
cases are part of a larger development leading to the Europeanization (of some aspects) 
of the national health-care organization. The past twelve years have seen a rapid emer-
gence of European Union (EU) free movement law in relation to health care. The case 
law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on services, from the emblematic Kohll 
and Decker cases to Watts and Van Delft, has been at the forefront of this development,1 
which has recently culminated in EU harmonization legislation with regard to patients’ 
 * Radboud University Nijmegen; Tilburg University and Dutch Healthcare Authority, respectively. Leigh Hancher, 
Okeoghene Odudu, and Hans Vedder provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this text. Responsibility for any 
remaining errors and for the views expressed here rests with the authors.
 1 Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931 and Case C-120/95, Nicolas 
Decker v. Caisse de maladie des employés privés [1998] ECR I-1831; Case C-372/04, The Queen, ex parte Yvonne Watts v. Bedford 
Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health (Watts) [2006] ECR I-4325, and Case C-345/09, Van Delft et al., judgment 
of 14 Oct. 2010 (nyr). Cf. J.W. van de Gronden, ‘Cross-Border Healthcare in the EU and the Organization of the National 
Healthcare Systems of the Member States. The Dynamics Resulting from the European Court of Justice’s Decisions on 
Free Movement and Competition Law’, Wisconsin International Law Journal (2009): 705; A. Dawes, ‘Bonjour Herr Doktor: 
National Healthcare Systems, the Internal Market and Cross-Border Medical Care within the EU’, Legal Issues of European 
Integration (2006): 27; V.G. Hatzopoulos, ‘Killing National Health and Insurance Systems but Healing Patients? The Euro-
pean Market for Healthcare Services after the Judgments of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms’, Common Market Law 
Review (2002): 683.
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rights.2 More recently, freedom of establishment cases have been setting new boundaries.3 
All these developments are contentious because, although the manner in which health 
care is organized differs widely between the Member States (while they can broadly be 
divided into insurance-based Bismarck systems and National Health Services (NHS) or 
Beveridge systems funded by taxation), in all cases public authorities are deeply involved 
in regulating not just the benefi ts but also the market structure at all levels.4 Similar 
problems (such as spiralling costs) due to increased aging, rising expectations, and tech-
nical developments have also arisen, albeit from different starting points. The resultant 
evolution of EU free movement law is fairly well charted.
To date, the EU competition law dimension of health care is less frequently discussed 
in the academic literature, although the ECJ has handed down signifi cant judgments on 
this subject, such as the recent ruling in the AG2R Prévoyance case.5 This is noteworthy 
because, following the modernization of EU competition law in May 2004, the National 
Competition Authorities (NCAs) of the Member States have been charged with the duty 
to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) in those instances when an EU dimension (i.e., effect upon trade between 
Member States) is involved.6 Moreover, most Member States have adopted highly similar 
systems of national competition law in a process of spontaneous harmonization. Hence, 
their competition rules must be interpreted in the light of European competition law. 
Finally, the EU system can be relied upon in national courts as the relevant provisions 
of the Treaty have direct effect. As a practical result, the number of cases based on the 
EU competition rules before national courts will likely multiply.7
The application of EU competition law rules and principles to health care at the 
national level is, on the one hand, potentially problematic given the political sensitivi-
ties involved, while, on the other hand, it may also invigorate the sector and open new 
opportunities for the more effi cient provision of health care. The issue is how the EU 
institutions will deal with competition law and health care. This leads to the question of 
whether specifi c health-care solutions will be found by these institutions and whether 
the application of the competition rules in this respect will be consistent.
These questions are particularly relevant to NCAs as well as national courts that 
are required to apply to health care either the EU competition rules or national rules 
2 See Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of patients’ rights 
in cross-border health care adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in January and February respectively OJ 
2011, L88/45. See the Press Release 7056/11 of the Council of 28 Feb. 2011.
3 See L. Hancher & W. Sauter, ‘One Step beyond? From Sodemare to DocMorris: The EU’s Freedom of Estab-
lishment Case Law Concerning Healthcare’, Common Market Law Review (2010): 117. An important case in this respect 
is Case C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Wiener Landesregierung and Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2009] 
ECR I-1721.
4 Cf. E. Mossialos, G. Permanand, R. Baeten & T.K. Hervey (eds), Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of 
European Union Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
5 Case C-437/09, AG2R Prévoyance v. Beaudout Père et Fils SARL, judgment of 3 Mar. 2011 (nyr).
6 Articles 3 and 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 Dec. 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003, L1/1.
7 On this matter, see H.H.B. Vedder, ‘Spontaneous Harmonisation of National (Competition) Laws in the Wake 
of the Modernisation of EC Competition Law’, Competition Law Review (2004): 5.
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based on the former. Therefore, a further question is whether current EU competition 
law provides them with the adequate guidance to accomplish this.
Our approach to addressing the questions on what role health-care-specifi c con-
cerns play in European competition law and whether this EU approach is suffi ciently 
clear for national application is given as follows.
First, it should be noted that we defi ne health care as encompassing medical care: 
that is, care provided by hospitals and by health-care professionals, such as general practi-
tioners, medical specialists, and dentists. Unlike long-term care, many Member States have 
introduced (some) elements of competition in the organization and provision of medical 
care/health care.8 This development gives rise to issues of competition law. Second, we 
will limit our discussion to the Treaty provisions on anticompetitive agreements between 
undertakings (or cartels) and the abuse of dominance as these provisions have led to cases 
where the specifi c features of health care were at stake.9 Hence, the present contribution 
will explore the EU cases on Articles 101 (cartels) and 102 (dominance) TFEU. This 
area of EU law applies exclusively to undertakings. That is why fi rst the EU approach to 
the concept of ‘undertaking’ in the health-care sector will be examined. Next, attention 
will be paid to Article 101 and subsequently to Article 102 TFEU. Before concluding, 
we will take a brief look at the interaction between the national and European levels of 
government, based on the EU law doctrines of effet utile and direct effect.
2. The Defi nition of Undertaking
Because the EU competition rules apply exclusively to (associations of) undertakings, 
the fi rst issue is how to defi ne the concept of undertaking. As a matter of national 
law, entities active in providing health care, managing the provision of health care, or 
providing health-care insurance are not regarded as undertakings. However, the EU 
concept is autonomous of national qualifi cations. How was this EU concept shaped? 
Did the ECJ take the view that health-care operators are not undertakings and do 
not fall within the scope of EU competition law, or did the ECJ decide that given 
8 See, e.g., J.W. van de Gronden & E. Szyszczak, ‘Constructing a “Solid” Multi-layered Health Care Edifi ce’, in 
Health Care and EU law, eds J.W. van de Gronden et al. (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press/Springer-Verlag, 2011), 481. See 
also the OECD Report, Enhancing Benefi cial Competition in Health Professions (DAF/COMP(2005)45).
9 To date, no signifi cant merger case law or decisional practice, where tensions between competition and health care 
were at issue, is available. For example, in cases on mergers between pharmaceutical companies, the Commission mainly 
concentrated on the consequences of the mergers on original and generic medicines and for research and development. 
See, e.g., Decision of the Commission of 27 May 2005 in Case COMP/M.3751, Novartis/Hexal. Moreover, the Commis-
sion cleared a couple of hospital mergers as the low market shares and the limited overlap of the activities of the parties 
concerned did not raise any serious competition concerns. See, e.g., Decision of the Commission of 21 Aug. 2007 in Case 
COMP/M.4788, Rozier/BHS. On state aid, cf. W. Sauter & J. van de Gronden, ‘State Aid, Services of General Economic 
Interest and Universal Service in Healthcare’, European Competition Law Review (forthcoming, 2011). At the national level, 
however, interesting developments have taken place. For example, the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) took a 
remarkable decision with regard to a merger between two hospitals. It accepted an effi ciency defence in order to clear this 
merger for reasons of preserving the quality of the hospital services concerned. See the decision of the NMa in Case 6424, 
Ziekenhuis Walcheren-Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen of 25 Mar. 2009. However, as this is a case under Dutch law, its precedential 
value is limited, and therefore, it will not be discussed further here. Cf. M. Canoy & W. Sauter, ‘Out of Control? Hospital 
Mergers in the Netherlands and the Public Interest’, European Competition Law Review (2010): 377.
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the economic dimension of the services provided competition does apply? The start-
ing point that should be stressed is that the case law of the Court on the concept of 
undertaking is functional in nature: this means that the formal legal defi nitions used 
in national law are irrelevant.10 What is decisive in this context is whether the entity 
concerned is involved in an economic activity.11 In this context, an economic activity 
is described as ‘any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given mar-
ket’ (in Pavlov and CNOP and CCG, see further below).12 Would this approach cover 
a health-care provider or insurer, or managing body? Below, we will fi rst examine 
whether health-care providers, such as hospitals, qualify as undertakings within the 
meaning of EU competition law. Subsequently, the concept of undertaking will be 
applied to national bodies managing health-care schemes (such as sickness funds and 
health insurance companies).
2.1. Health-care providers
As for health-care providers, the ECJ easily assumes that they are engaged in economic 
activities. In Pavlov, for example, the ECJ held that independent medical specialists per-
form services in a market (the market for specialized medical services), inter alia, because 
they receive remuneration for these services and assume the fi nancial risks that are associ-
ated with their professional activity. The complexity and technical nature of their services 
and the fact that the practice of their profession is regulated did not affect this conclu-
sion. Because the medical specialists were engaged in an economic activity, they were 
held to constitute individual undertakings in the sense of the competition rules. The 
same line of reasoning was deployed by the General Court in CNOP and CCG. In this 
case, it was held that pharmacists were undertakings insofar as they were independently 
established. As the ECJ did in Pavlov, the General Court stressed the point that pharma-
cists provide services for economic consideration at their own risk.
Providing goods and services in competition – or in a context where competition 
is possible (potential competition) – is likewise seen as carrying out an economic activity 
as an undertaking.13 This was, for instance, held by the Court in relation to ambulance 
10 Case 118/85, Commission v. Italy (Transparency Directive) [1987] ECR 2599, para. 11. On the methodology of the 
Court, see also W. Sauter & H. Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law, the Public and Private Spheres of the Internal 
Market before the EU Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
11 Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 21.
12 Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov et al. v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECR 
I-6451, para. 73 ff. (with reference to Case 118/85, Commission v. Italy (Transparency Directive) [1987] ECR 2599, para. 7 and 
Case C-35/96, Commission v. Italy (Customs Agents) [1998] ECR I-3851, para. 36) and Case T-23/09, Conseil National de 
l’Ordre des Pharmaciens (CNOP) and Conseil Central de la Section G de l’Ordre National des Pharmaciens (CCG) v. the European 
Commission, 26 Oct. 2010 (nyr), para. 70 ff. The allocation of risk is sometimes used to identify the relevant entity. Cf. Case 
C-22/98, Criminal Proceedings against Jean Claude Becu et al. [2001] ECR I-5665. The main reason for this is to delineate the 
application of the competition rules from the Treaty provisions on the free movement of workers. Professionals fall only 
within the scope of EU competition law, insofar as they are independent (self-employed) and do not fall under the authority 
of an employer.
13 Case C-41/90, Höfner, above n. 11, paras 22 and 23.
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services in the 2001 Glöckner case.14 Because services such as were provided by  Glöckner 
in the market for emergency transport and (non-emergency) patient transport are not 
always provided by medical aid organizations or by public authorities, these services 
were held to constitute an economic activity in the ECJ’s view. This was not altered by 
the fact that some providers of such services might be less competitive as the result of 
public service obligations than other providers without similar obligations. Hence, the 
party offering these services (Glöckner) was an undertaking for the purposes of the EU 
competition rules. (However, due to the special characteristics of its activities, it was also 
found to be invested with a Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI) providing a 
proportional exception to the competition rules.15) Accordingly, in the IRIS-Z hospitals 
case, the Commission contended that services provided by the public hospitals concerned 
constituted economic activities as similar services were offered by private health-care 
operators.16 Hence, in this decision, the argument of potential competition was also taken 
into account.
This actual or potential offering of services in competition test leads to the conclu-
sion that most if not all private bodies and entities that are active in the provision of 
health care are likely to be found to constitute undertakings. This holds across the EU 
irrespective of which type of health-care provision and fi nancing model prevails in the 
particular Member State concerned. Hence, it is irrelevant whether these undertaking 
operate in the so-called ‘Bismarck systems’ (in which sickness funds or other types of 
health insurers are the managing bodies) or in what are usually called ‘Beveridge systems’ 
(in which tax funded health-care benefi ts are provided by the state to its population 
nominally free of charge, which implies that no sickness funds or insurance companies 
are involved in granting benefi ts to patients).
In sum, the test of whether health-care providers are engaged in economic activi-
ties is not based on health-care-specifi c considerations. The only argument that seems 
to matter to the ECJ is whether competition, at least potentially, is possible. As in health 
care, where medical treatment is usually offered in exchange for economic consideration, 
competition is deemed applicable. Hence, the approach of the concept of undertaking 
towards health-care providers is based on a straightforward view: patients have to pay 
14 Case C-475/99, Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v. Landkreis Südwestpfalz [2001] ECR I-8089.
15 Effectively, the Court proceeds in two steps. First, it fi nds that there may be some elements of solidarity but 
that these are insuffi cient (in the sense that the national scheme under review is not only based on solidarity but also on 
competition) to exclude application of the concept of undertaking. However, subsequently, it accepts that the degree of 
solidarity involved is, nevertheless, suffi cient to invoke Art. 106(2) TFEU on SGEI. That means the entities involved are 
undertakings but are shielded from the full force of competition law as they provide SGEI. This approach was pioneered 
in Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751, Joined Cases 
C-115/97, C-116/97, and C-117/97, Brentjens’ Handelsonderneming BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in 
Bouwmaterialen [1999] ECR I-6025, and Case C-219/97, Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor 
de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven [1999] ECR I-6121. In more recent cases alongside the solidarity aspect, the degree of public 
supervision involved has been emphasized. Cf. Case C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v. Maschinenbau- und Metall- Berufs-
genossenschaft [2009] ECR I-1513 and Case C-437/09, AG2R Prévoyance, above n. 5.
16 See para. 109 of the Decision of the Commission of 28 Oct. 2009 with regard to state aid NN 54/2009 (ex CP 
244/2005) – Belgium – fi nancing of public hospitals of the IRIS network of the Brussels capital region.
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their medical bills (either directly or indirectly), and therefore, the providers, which draw 
up these bills, should observe competition law.
2.2. National bodies managing health-care schemes
In contrast with the discussion above with relation to health-care providers, however, 
the ECJ has adopted a different approach towards national bodies managing health-care 
schemes, that is, providers of health insurance for publicly defi ned (universal) cover-
age, respectively, the purchasing activities of (public) health-care managing bodies. It is 
apparent from the more recent AOK and FENIN judgments that the activities, such as 
purchasing health care, of these bodies should be seen in the context of the principle of 
solidarity.17 The two legs of health care, fi nancing and provision of care, are thus treated 
differently.
Financial solidarity and excluding provision on market terms are the requirements 
for classifying a system as exclusively fulfi lling a social function.18 In this case, the entities 
involved are not regarded as undertakings and are excluded from the scope of competi-
tion law (but not from the market freedoms and public procurement rules that apply to 
public bodies).19 This conclusion is reached taking into account the objective and com-
pulsory nature of a system, the degree of public involvement, any elements of redistribu-
tion, and the manner in which contributions are calculated and benefi ts are awarded.20
Striking in this respect is the 2004 judgment in AOK.21 At stake was the fi xing 
of maximum contributions by the German health insurance funds towards the costs of 
medicinal products. The Court had been asked whether this was illegal under the com-
petition rules. The German system made it compulsory for employees to join the public 
law scheme, but, on the other hand, the insurance premiums did not only depend on the 
income of the insured party but also on the rates set by the insurance company. There 
was a degree of rate competition between these insurers in order to gain the business of 
both those with compulsory insurance and customers who took out insurance volun-
tarily, with price differentials of up to 30% and up to 5% of customers switching insurers 
17 See also J. Lear, E. Mossialos & B. Karl, ‘EU Competition Law and Health Policy’, in Health Systems Governance in 
Europe, above n. 4, 343.
18 More broadly in the notion of solidarity, cf. C. Newdick, ‘Citizenship, Free Movement and Healthcare: Cementing 
Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity’, Common Market Law Review (2006): 1645.
19 In landmark decisions such as Case C-157/99, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ & H.T.M. Peer-
booms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473 and Case C-385/99, V.G. Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge Waar-
borgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen 
[2003] I-4509, the ECJ reviewed the refusal of Dutch sickness funds to reimburse costs of cross-border health care in the 
light of the Treaty provisions on the free movement of services, whereas in Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01, 
and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband et al. v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co. et al. [2004] ECR I-2493, the ECJ held 
that German sickness funds were not undertakings within the meaning of EU competition law.
20 Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Christian Poucet v. Assurances Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Région-
ale du Languedoc-Roussillon [1993] ECR I-637; Case C-205/03 P, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria 
(FENIN) v. Commission [2006] ECR I-6295.
21 Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01, and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband, above n. 19. Annotated by S. 
Belhaj & J.W. van de Gronden, European Competition Law Review (2004): 682. Cf. M. Krajewski & M. Farley, ‘Non-economic 
Activities in Upstream Markets and the Scope of Competition Law after FENIN’, European Law Review (2007): 111.
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each year. The insurance funds also implemented a risk equalization system, which made 
insurers with less burdensome risk profi les contribute to the fi nancing of the funds that 
took care of insuring the more expensive risks. The Court held that the German health 
insurance funds fulfi lled an exclusively social function based on the principle of solidar-
ity and in the absence of any profi t motive. In this context, the health insurance funds 
form a collective that is based on solidarity (or Solidargemeinschaft), which shares costs 
and risks equitably:
The sickness funds are therefore not in competition with one another or with private institutions 
as regards grant of the obligatory statutory benefi ts in respect of treatment or medicinal products 
which constitutes their main function.
In addition:
The latitude available to the sickness funds when setting the contribution rate and their freedom 
to engage in some competition with one another in order to attract members does not call this 
analysis into question.22
This freedom and that element of competition were only seen as a way of pursu-
ing an effi ciency gain ‘in accordance with economic principles of sound management’. 
Therefore, the sickness funds were not considered to be undertakings and, as a result, did 
not fall within the scope of the competition rules.
In our view, what seems to have mattered most to the ECJ was that no competition 
was possible on the benefi ts to which patients were entitled. These benefi ts were fi xed 
in national law, and as a result, the sickness funds did not enjoy any discretion when 
granting these benefi ts to insured persons. Apparently, as long as health insurers have no 
possibility of infl uencing the level of benefi ts, in the ECJ’s view, it is not of any interest 
that they do compete on price.
It is clear from the outset that the outcome of the AOK test is hard to predict. 
For instance, a year after AOK in the state aid fi eld, the Commission found that Dutch 
health insurers did constitute undertakings even though they have limited infl uence 
over the level of benefi ts and have comparable price differentials and switching rates to 
those found in AOK.23 However, the (privatized) Dutch health insurance companies are 
allowed to be profi t-making, and therefore, it may be assumed that this feature of the 
Dutch health-care organization was instrumental for the Commission in establishing the 
applicability of European competition law.
Another important matter to be settled was whether managing bodies for schemes 
that were predominately based on solidarity could qualify as undertakings when purchas-
ing goods or services (although the managing of the schemes concerned did not consti-
tute economic activities). The competition authorities of some EU Member States had 
taken the position that given their considerable impact on various health-care markets 
22 Ibid., paras 54 and 56.
23 Decision of the Commission of 3 May 2005 with regard to state aids N 541/2004 and N 542/2004 – The 
Netherlands – risk equalization system and retention of reserves.
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as purchasers, these bodies should observe competition law in their business relations 
with suppliers.24
However, in FENIN (2003, 2006), the European courts took a different route. At 
issue was a complaint about abuse of dominant position (based on systematic late pay-
ments to providers of medical goods and equipment by an average of 300 days) by the 
management bodies of the Spanish National Health System (SNS), which collectively 
accounted for 80% of purchases of medical goods and equipment in Spain.25 In this 
case, it was accepted (or at any rate not effectively contested) that the provision of 
health-care services by SNS was purely of a social nature. Thereby, the main question 
posed to the Court became whether the purchasing activity of the management bodies 
should be examined as a separate activity resulting in their consideration as undertak-
ings to which the competition rules applied. In a summarily motivated reaction, the 
Court held:
(…) there is no need to dissociate the activity of purchasing goods from the subsequent use to 
which they are put in order to determine the nature of that purchasing activity, and [that] the 
nature of the purchasing activity must be determined according to whether or not the subsequent 
use of the purchased goods amounts to an economic activity.26
Consequently, there was no economic activity nor an undertaking involved, 
and therefore, there could be no question of applying EU competition law.
The FENIN logic, such as it is, clearly has important implications for NHS sys-
tems elsewhere in the EU as well, which will similarly combine public provision of 
care with purchasing private goods and services in the market. On the one hand, the 
scope of EU competition law in health care is, thus, limited. On the other hand, it 
may be assumed that an effective application of the rules on public procurement and 
state aid would discipline the exercise of public purchasing power for the greater part. 
This evidently makes it important that the interface between the competition rules, 
the state aid, and the procurement rules is well managed. As the public procurement 
rules oblige public bodies to contract with the most competitive service providers 
(or suppliers of goods), these rules are capable of restoring the imbalance between 
public health bodies and their contractors. Hence (as is the case for competition 
law), it is of great importance that public procurement law is sensitive to the spe-
cific  features of health-care markets. However, because public procurement law and 
24 For example, the Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal (CCAT)’s ruling in the BetterCare case found that 
purchasing by a public body, in certain circumstances, is an economic activity carried out by an undertaking and, therefore, 
may be subject to the provisions of the UK Competition Act 1998 [2002] CAT 7. The German and Dutch authorities like-
wise held a contrasting view. Cf., e.g., Bundesgerichtshof, Urteil vom 12 Nov. 2002, Kommunale Einkaufsgemeinschaften, 
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (2003), 625–632 and the Decision of the Director General of the NMa of 10 Mar. 2000 in 
Case 181, Zorgkantoren (AWBZ Agencies). See also J.W. van de Gronden, ‘Purchasing Care: Economic Activity or Service 
of General (Economic) Interest?’, European Competition Law Review (2004): 84. For other examples of national authorities 
sometimes tougher approaches to competition law, see the review by Lear et al., above n. 17.
25 See Case T-319/99, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v. Commission (FENIN) [2003] 
ECR I- 357 and Case C-205/03 P, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v. Commission (FENIN) 
[2006] ECR I-6295.
26 See para. 26 of the ECJ judgment in Case C-205/03, FENIN, above n. 25.
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the state aid rules fall outside the scope of this contribution, we will not address this 
in further detail.27
An important recent case is AG2R Prévoyance, which concerned compulsory supple-
mentary health insurance in France. Employers and employees in the traditional bakery 
sector had set up a supplementary health-care scheme and had entrusted the manage-
ment of this scheme to a provident society (AG2R Prévoyance). The question arose 
whether AG2R Prévoyance was engaged in economic activities with regard to this task. 
The ECJ stressed two elements in order to establish whether competition law applied: 
the application of the principle of solidarity and the degree of supervision by the state.
The ECJ found that suffi cient solidarity elements existed (such as the lack of a 
direct link between the levels of contributions and that of the benefi ts concerned), but 
that a public context in terms of supervision of the insurance scheme was lacking. The 
ECJ stressed that, on the one hand, the social partners, who had set up the collective 
insurance scheme, determined the level of benefi ts to which the insured persons were 
entitled.28 This testifi ed to its social nature. On the other hand, the social partners them-
selves selected a body for managing the health insurance scheme concerned.29 Although 
they entrusted this task to AG2R, the social partners could have opted for a commercial 
insurance company instead. In addition, AG2R enjoyed a margin of negotiation concern-
ing the terms of its entrustment. Hence, AG2R was held to be an undertaking engaged 
in an economic activity.
In sum, the ECJ carried out a two-tiered test by not only exploring the role of 
solidarity but also mapping the impact of the state supervisory mechanisms. This last 
element was introduced by the ECJ in the Kattner Stahlbau (2009) case,30 with respect 
to the application of competition to statutory insurance against accidents at work and 
occupational diseases.31 Based on AG2R, it now seems that the ECJ has extended this 
approach towards bodies managing social security schemes. Apart from being governed 
by the principle of solidarity, these bodies must be subject to a substantial degree of 
control by the state in order to escape from competition law. This implies that bodies 
operating in a public environment are more likely to be exempted from the competition 
rules than privatized bodies providing similar services. The result of this approach is that 
privatizing health care – and diminishing the degree of state supervision – will generally 
lead to the applicability of EU competition law, even in health-care systems that remain 
predominantly based on solidarity. After all, the absence of (substantial) state supervi-
sion will result in the ECJ ruling that the managing bodies concerned are engaged in 
economic activities.
27 See, e.g., V. Hassopoulos, ‘Public Procurement and State Aid in National Health Systems’, in Health Systems Gover-
nance in Europe, above n. 4, 379.
28 See para. 54 of Case C-437/09, AG2R Prévoyance, above n. 5.
29 Ibid., paras 58–65.
30 Case C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v. Maschinen- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft [2009] ECR I-1513.
31 In Case C-218/00, Cisal di Battistello Venanzio & C. Sas v. Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul 
lavoro (INAIL) [2002] ECR I-691, the ECJ already gave an initial impetus to taking into account the degree of supervision 
of the state with regard to the concept of undertaking.
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2.3. Evaluation
The analysis carried out above shows that the European courts have developed an 
approach towards the concept of undertaking and bodies managing health-care schemes 
(as in FENIN), which is health-care specifi c. These health-care operators are only cov-
ered by the concept of undertaking insofar as they do not operate in accordance with 
principles that are, in the fi rst place, predominantly based on solidarity. At the heart of 
this approach is solidarity. If this principle is predominant, the ECJ may decide that com-
petition does not apply. As demonstrated, a national health-care scheme is only regarded 
to be predominately based on this principle if the relevant benefi ts are fi xed in national 
legislation: as we have seen in AG2R however, this could simply mean declaring collec-
tive agreements universally binding. In other words, competition law is not applicable 
if the managing bodies cannot compete with regard to these benefi ts. However, as was 
shown in AOK, even the possibility of (a degree of) price competition is not decisive for 
fi nding that the entities concerned are engaged in economic activities. Hence, who ulti-
mately fi xes the level of benefi ts constitutes the crux of solidarity in health-care schemes 
under EU law. By incorporating solidarity in its test of undertaking, the ECJ pays due 
consideration to health-care-specifi c concerns, as solidarity is one of the constituting 
elements of health-care policy.
Solidarity alone, however, is not enough to escape the competition rules. The sec-
ond element is that the management of such a health-care scheme should be carried out 
under substantial supervision by the state. Since AG2R Prévoyance, it could be argued 
that even if they are solidarity-based, only state-controlled health-care schemes may be 
immune from competition law. In case of a mix of solidarity and competition elements 
or in the absence of supervision by the state health insurers, they qualify as undertakings 
within the meaning of EU competition law.32 Bodies managing a scheme that is based on 
a mix of solidarity and competition are obliged to observe the EU rules on competition 
(however, see the exception for SGEI discussed below).
Because in its case law on the concept of undertaking the ECJ attaches great value 
to the extent managing bodies can infl uence the level of benefi ts, it may be assumed 
that NHS bodies, operating in a Beveridge system with general taxation-based fi nancing 
and solidarity, are more immune from competition law than are health insurers active 
in Bismarck systems based precisely on an insurance system. After all, in the former 
supply-driven tax-based system (where sickness funds or insurance companies do not 
play any role), governments can determine the level of benefi ts with precision, whereas 
in the latter case those governments that rely on a health insurance scheme may decide 
to leave some room for competition with regard to the benefi ts that the insured persons 
are entitled to (e.g., relating to supplementary insurance). Put differently, fi xing the level 
32 See, e.g., Case C-244/94, Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurance et al., v. Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche 
(FFSA) [1995] ECR I-4015; Case C-67/96, Albany; Joined Cases C-115/97, C-116/97, and C-117/97, Brentjens; Case 
C-219/97, Drijvende Bokken, above n. 15.
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of benefi ts by the government seems to be inherent in tax-based health-care systems, but 
Member States tend to be more fl exible if they operate a health insurance system, leaving 
the parties involved more exposed to the competition rules. On top of that, supervision 
by the state seems a constitutive characteristic of NHS systems, whereas the state is more 
likely to step back in health insurance systems.33
It, therefore, appears that the ECJ uses an expansive concept of undertaking for 
health-care providers and a moderated concept for health insurers/managing bodies. The 
broad meaning of ‘undertaking’ opens the door to a multitude of health-care cases both 
under EU and (EU law-based) national competition laws. We now move on from the 
defi nition of undertaking to the application of the competition rules to health care in 
those cases where undertakings are involved, starting with anticompetitive agreements: 
cartels.
3. Cartel Prohibition in Health Care
The cartel prohibition applies to agreements between concerted practices of undertak-
ings, as well as decisions of associations of undertakings. So far, there are few if any EU 
level decisions or judgments concerning the cartel prohibition applied to health care 
with the exception of the pharmaceutical sector.34 Thus, there is little specifi c guidance 
for health-care operators carrying out a self-assessment as required under Articles 101(1) 
and 101(3) TFEU.
3.1. Health care and article 101 TFEU
The most signifi cant cases that do address the application of the cartel prohibition in 
health care are the GlaxoSmithKline and Pavlov cases.35
The GlaxoSmithKline case is noteworthy because here the health-care-specifi c ques-
tion of the role of insurers in respect of the costs was raised. In the pharmaceutical sector, 
the commercial interests of the industry, which are based on costly research protected 
33 For example, to meet the requirements of the Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 Jun. 1992 on the coordina-
tion of laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and amending 
Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (Third Non-life Insurance Directive), OJ 1992, L228/1.
34 Cf. L. Hancher, ‘The EU Pharmaceuticals Markets: Parameters and Pathways’, in Health Systems Governance in 
Europe, above n. 4. In 2008–2009, the pharmaceutical sector has been the subject of an industry-wide pan-EU sector 
enquiry by DG Competition, which concluded with a Commission Communication of 8 Jul. 2009, Pharmaceutical Sector 
Enquiry Report. This stated, inter alia, that it takes too long for generic medicines to reach the market and fewer innovative 
medicines are reaching the market, while there is an urgent need for an EU patent and patent litigation system. The Com-
mission is to scrutinize the sector more closely and promote regulatory reform including at the national level with regard to 
approval procedures, clinical trials, and the uptake of generic medicines. At both levels, measures are to be taken to improve 
price competition.
35 We are passing over Joined Cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P, Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and Com-
mission v. Bayer AG [2004] ECR I-23; Case T-41/96, Bayer AG v. Commission [2000] ECR II-3383. This revolved around 
the distinction between unilateral conduct, caught by Art. 102 TFEU, and concerted practices/agreements, caught by Art. 
101(1) TFEU, which are mutually exclusive. Case C-446/05, Criminal Proceedings against Doulamis [2008] ECR I-1377, 
where the Court found that Art. 101 TFEU read in conjunction with Art. 4(3) of the TEU (effet utile) did not apply to a 
Belgian ban on advertising for dentists, is dealt with below under the relationship between EU and national rules.
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by intellectual property (IP) rights, and the contestation of the resulting advantages 
clash with attempts by the Member States to contain costs. At issue in the GlaxoSmith 
Kline saga was its practice of maintaining differentiated prices in the Spanish market 
in order to block parallel imports (tariff arbitrage).36 The Commission did establish a 
breach of Article 101 TFEU on this basis. The General Court, however, had focused on 
the question of whether restrictions of parallel imports deny benefi ts to consumers (or 
whether these benefi ts are substantial). In solving this question, it assigned considerable 
importance to the fact that the bodies managing the health-care scheme of the Member 
State concerned usually bear the costs of the supply of medicines. It found that, given 
the existence of price regulation at the national level, the benefi ts appeared to accrue 
primarily to the parallel importers themselves. It further pointed out that higher prices 
resulting from restrictions to the parallel trade in pharmaceuticals were not detrimental 
to consumers, as the managing bodies were under an obligation to reimburse them. As a 
result, the General Court was of the opinion that agreements containing the restrictions 
to parallel trade did not have the object of restricting competition. Hereby, the General 
Court departed from long-standing case law, according to which restrictions to parallel 
trade were considered to be a severe infringement of the cartel prohibition (‘hard-core 
restriction’), which was absolutely banned in order to stimulate market integration and 
dated back to traditional landmark decisions such as Grundig/Consten in 1966.37
The General Court based this decision on the view that consumer welfare is the 
overriding goal in European competition law. Moreover, its reasoning relied on a health-
care-specifi c argument, as it contended that the costs of the consumption of medicines 
are borne by the health insurers and not by the consumers, the position of which was 
not directly affected by the restrictive practices under review.38 Finally, the General Court 
did fi nd concrete adverse effects on competition (resulting from the agreements under 
review). However, this did not call into question its change of approach towards restric-
tions to parallel trade.
The Court of Justice approached the practices of GlaxoSmithKline differently. It 
stressed that apart from consumer welfare other goals (such as the market structure and 
competition itself) must be weighed and emphasized that the view that regards territo-
rial restrictions as a restriction by object remains good law. However, at the end of the 
day, the outcome of the judgments of the ECJ and General Court did not differ sub-
stantially. After all, both Courts agreed that an infringement of Article 101 TFEU was 
involved, while the Commission would have to collect more information in order to be 
able to decide whether the exception of Article 101(3) TFEU applied.39 The net effect 
36 See Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline [2006] ECR II-2969 and Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 
P, and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission (C-501/06 P), Commission v. GlaxoSmithKline Services 
Unlimited (C-513/06 P), European Association of Euro Pharmaceutical Companies (EAEPC) v. Commission (C-515/06 P), and 
Asociación de exportadores españoles de productos farmacéuticos (Aseprofar) v. Commission (C-519/06 P) [2009] I-9291.
37 Case 56/64, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission [1966] ECR 429.
38 See para. 131 of the General Court judgment in GlaxoSmithKline, above n. 36.
39 Cf. J.W. van de Gronden, ‘The Treaty Provisions on Competition and Healthcare’, in EU Law and Healthcare, eds 
J.W. van de Gronden et al. (The Hague: Asser Press, 2011).
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on behaviour blocking parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is that this remains prima facie 
illegal under EU law and a health-care-specifi c context is not capable of altering this 
point of departure.
It is a pity that in this case the ECJ did not express its views on how the traditional 
approach towards restrictions of parallel trade could be tailored to health care. Perhaps 
it neglected to do so precisely because it thought that this was a regular market where 
intervention to sustain prices – if necessary to remedy market failures – should be lim-
ited to public authorities. At least in its assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU, the ECJ 
could have elaborated on the role played by the fact that health insurers usually bear 
the costs.
Another noteworthy case is Pavlov (already mentioned in relation to the defi nition 
of ‘undertaking’), which concerned a collective supplementary pension scheme set up 
by the Dutch organization of medical specialists. Again, a question concerning health-
care-specifi c costs was at issue, as a comparative analysis was made between the ‘fi nancial 
burden’ caused by this pension scheme and the expenses of the other components of the 
services provided by medical specialists. Here, the ECJ stressed that due account must 
be taken of the economic context in which the concerned undertakings operate, of the 
products or services covered by the decisions of those undertakings, of the structure of 
the market concerned, and of the actual conditions in which this market functions.40 As 
the arrangement on the supplementary pension scheme standardizes only a minor part 
of the costs of the complex services offered by medical specialists that require expensive 
medical equipment and infrastructure, it did not cause an appreciable effect on compe-
tition in medical services and was, as a result, not in violation of Article 101 TFEU.41 
Here, traces of a health-care-specifi c approach are discernible at least in the sense that the 
health-care-specifi c facts are the foundation of the ruling: the costs of complicated medi-
cal services that require the existence of medical infrastructure and equipment totally 
outweigh the relative costs of a pension scheme. However, one swallow does not make 
a summer: to date, the ECJ has not repeated this approach when evaluating restrictions 
in the health-care context.
3.2. The pursuit of legitimate objectives
So far, we have seen few traces of a sector-specifi c approach. This does not mean that 
the ECJ never allows sector-specifi c concerns to override the competition rules: outside 
health care, the ECJ has opted more decisively for an approach that pays due  consideration 
40 See para. 91 of Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavlov, above n. 12.
41 ‘The decision in question produces restrictive effects only in relation to one cost factor of the services offered by 
self-employed medical specialists, namely the supplementary pension scheme, which is insignifi cant in comparison with 
other factors, such as medical fees or the cost of medical equipment. The cost of the supplementary pension scheme has 
only a marginal and indirect infl uence on the fi nal cost of the services offered by self-employed medical specialists.’ Ibid., 
para. 95.
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to the special features of the sector involved. In the 2002 Wouters case,42 for example, 
it was called upon to review a decision taken by the Dutch Bar Association (a ban on 
multidisciplinary partnerships between accountants and lawyers). The ECJ said that for 
the purpose of the application of Article 101 TFEU:
(…) account must fi rst of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the associa-
tion of undertakings was taken or produces its effects. More particularly, account must be taken 
of its objectives, which are here connected with the need to make rules relating to organisation, 
qualifi cations, professional ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure that the ultimate 
consumers of legal services and the sound administration of justice are provided with the neces-
sary guarantees in relation to integrity and experience (see, to that effect, Case C-3/95 Reisebüro 
Broede [1996] ECR I-6511, paragraph 38). It has then to be considered whether the consequen-
tial effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives.43
Eventually, the ECJ held that that the decision taken by the Dutch Bar Association 
was necessary given the professional ethics at stake and, therefore, not contrary to the 
cartel prohibition.
In Meca-Medina (2006),44 the ECJ even applied the approach developed in Wouters 
to sports. At issue were anti-doping rules and the plaintiffs had argued that these rules 
were contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. The ECJ put forward that the anti-doping rules 
issued by sports associations do not:
(…) necessarily constitute a restriction of competition incompatible with the common market, 
within the meaning of Article 81 EC [now Article 101 TFEU], since they are justifi ed by a legiti-
mate objective. Such a limitation is inherent in the organisation and proper conduct of competi-
tive sport and its very purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry between athletes.45
Remarkably, the ECJ referred in general wording to the need to achieve legitimate 
objectives (not public objectives), which meant that competition law was not infringed.46 
Hence, in areas other than health care, the ECJ seems to have developed an approach 
that is capable of accommodating issues of general interest in the application of European 
competition law. In Wouters, the ECJ focused on the issue of professional ethics and held 
that this issue could justify not applying Article 101 TFEU (provided that certain con-
ditions were met). However, in Meca-Medina, the ECJ disconnected this approach from 
the specifi c context of professional ethics and ruled that restrictive agreements that are 
necessary to achieve legitimate objectives are permissible. It goes without saying that in 
health care such objectives may well be at stake.47 For instance, many health-care pro-
viders are guided by a specifi c medical deontology (starting from the Hippocratic oath) 
and might apply rules that are ‘inherent’ in the organization of health care (one example 
42 Case C-309/99, J.C.J. Wouters, J.W. Savelbergh & Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. Algemene Raad van de Ned-
erlandse Orde van Advocaten (Wouters) [2002] ECR I-1577.
43 Ibid., para. 97.
44 Case C-519/04P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission (Meca-Medina) [2006] ECR I-6991.
45 Ibid., para. 45.
46 Ibid.
47 See also Lear et al., above n. 17.
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might be rules prohibiting doctors from advertising48 or from using their qualifi cations in 
a non-medical setting). This deontology could plead in favour of exempting the medical 
profession from the application of Article 101 TFEU based on the doctrine of legitimate 
objectives even if certain deontological provisions could restrain competition between 
the members of the profession.
4. Abuse of Dominance and Health Care
Abuse of dominance concerns cases where a single undertaking has (or in exceptional 
cases several undertakings acting collusively have)49 gained such a strong position on 
the relevant market that it is able to act independently from competitors, customers, 
suppliers, and/or ultimately consumers.50 Below, we will examine how the general rules 
developed by the ECJ and the Commission with regard to Article 102 TFEU fi t in a 
health-care context. Subsequently, the main case law concerning this Treaty provision 
and health care will be explored.
4.1. The General rules of article 102 TFEU and health care
As is well known, in order to determine whether a dominant position exists, the rel-
evant market needs to be defi ned in two dimensions: the product market (e.g., hospital 
care) and the geographic market (e.g., a particular city or local area).51 A classical tool 
for defi ning the market is the ‘Small but Signifi cant Non-transitory Increase in Price’ 
(SSNIP) test, which is also frequently used by the Commission.52 This means that by 
way of a thought experiment (i.e., hypothetically), the price of the product concerned 
is increased by 5%–10% and the reaction of customers is observed. If customers switch 
to other products and/or providers in signifi cant numbers, these products and/or their 
providers must be added to the market because they discipline the behaviour of the 
provider who is being investigated. This process is repeated until there is no longer any 
signifi cant substitution: thus, the market is determined.
48 Cf. Case T-144/99, Institute of Professional Representatives before the European Patent Offi ce v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities [2001] II-1087, where the General Court held that a ban on comparative publicity issued by an associa-
tion of professionals was justifi able in the light of Art. 101(3) TFEU.
49 A tight oligopoly of several large undertakings can lead to a position of collective dominance: (1) the members 
must be able to observe each other’s behaviour closely; (2) there has to be an enforcement mechanism against deviant 
behaviour (e.g., punitive price reductions); and (3) it must be impossible for outsiders such as competitors or entrants to 
undermine the oligopoly. Case T-342/99, Airtours plc v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2585.
50 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission [1979] ECR 461. Cf. A. Ezrachi (ed.), Art. 82 EC: Refl ec-
tions on Its Recent Evolution (Oxford: Hart Publishers, 2009).
51 Commission Notice on the defi nition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, 
OJ 1997, C372/5. It is also required that a signifi cant part of the internal market be involved. This would be the case for the 
entire territory of a Member State or part of a larger Member State. Important infrastructural bottlenecks such as a major 
sea- or airport can also constitute a signifi cant part of the internal market. Cf. Case C-179/90, Merci convenzionali porto di 
Genova SpA v. Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA [1991] ECR I-05889.
52 See the Commission Notice, above n. 51, para. 15 ff.
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From the perspective of health-care markets, the application of the SSNIP test in 
the context of Article 102 TFEU has signifi cant drawbacks. (In the Article 101 TFEU 
setting, markets may well be formally defi ned, but in cartel cases, market defi nition is not 
as important as in Article 102 TFEU cases because, for Article 101 TFEU, the threshold 
is appreciability, not dominance.) The problems that are specifi c to health care arise espe-
cially in insurance-based Bismarck systems as consumers do not directly bear the costs of 
their treatment on account of the ‘third party pays’ principle. In this case, as the General 
Court pointed out in GlaxoSmithKline,53 the insurer pays the costs of the health care 
consumed and because there is no direct relationship between the premiums paid by the 
consumer and his or her choices, the latter are hardly affected by cost.
This problem is now being addressed at the national level by health economists 
who have developed econometric models that are based, for instance, on the willing-
ness of customers to travel to alternative providers (with additional travel time to next 
preferred options as the equivalent of a price increase) or their willingness to pay in 
order to include a particular provider in the package of care available to them (which 
takes account of the role played by insurers).54 Market defi nition is not just crucial to 
determining the existence of dominance for abuse cases but also to merger cases (like-
wise largely based on dominance) and, to a lesser extent, cartel cases: especially when 
hard-core restrictions or restrictions by object are involved, the exact defi nition of the 
market is less important.
However, these experiments are so far taking place purely at the national level 
and the Commission has no signifi cant experience with defi ning health-care-specifi c 
markets. This could give rise to challenges that the national models do not fi t the Euro-
pean competition law framework and are not in line with general EU principles on 
market defi nition. At the same time, national authorities cannot be blamed for trying 
out state-of-the-art methods, in particular where, for example, in hospital markets, tra-
ditional methods have proven untenable.55 Even if (as is likely the case) the new market 
defi nition methods are compatible with EU law, it would be a pity if needless legal 
wrangles on this point arise just because the Commission continues to rely on a very 
general Notice on a market defi nition dating from 1997. At the same time, outcomes 
that could turn out to be incompatible with EU law are not hypothetical. For instance, 
the Dutch NCA had to reconsider its approach56 towards the concept of undertaking 
53 Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline, above n. 36.
54 Cf. M. Varkevisser, ‘Patient Choice, Competition and Antitrust Enforcement in Dutch Hospital Markets’, PhD 
Thesis (Rotterdam, 2010); M. Varkevisser, C.S. Capps & F.T. Schut, ‘Defi ning Hospital Markets for Antitrust Enforcement: 
New Approaches and Their Applicability to The Netherlands’, Health Economics, Policy and Law (2008): 7–29. Initially, the 
Elzinga Hogarty test was applied based on the number of consumers that would travel from within a region to outside the 
region and vice versa. This method has been discredited in US merger practice, not least because in a 2006 case Professor 
Ken Hogarty testifi ed that his method was not useful in health cases.
55 Ibid., and DOJ/FTC, Improving Healthcare: A Dose of Competition (US Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission, 2004). Between 1995 and 2004, the DOJ and FTC lost a score of hospital merger cases based on unsatisfac-
tory geographic market defi nitions and ended up giving up on hospital care mergers for a number of years as a result.
56 In its view, Dutch sickness funds were undertakings, as they were engaged in price competition (with regard to 
the premiums) and enjoyed a wide margin of discretion when purchasing health care. In subsequent case law (AOK and 
FENIN), the ECJ has made clear that these arguments are not decisive for establishing the applicability of competition 
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in relation to sickness funds when the Court’s ruling in AOK57 diametrically opposed 
its own decisional practice.
It is well known that dominance is determined on the basis of market shares (the 
dividing line is 50%)58 and other factors such as the relative market share (as compared 
to the next largest competitors), countervailing market power, and commercial (brands), 
technical (patents), and fi nancial advantages (‘deep pockets’ or preferential access to capi-
tal). The existence of entry barriers as a result of law and regulation can also be relevant – 
especially in highly regulated sectors such as health care. This may depend on which seg-
ment of the sector is concerned, for example, entry in the hospital market is likely to be 
much more diffi cult than it would be for an individual medical practitioner (such as a 
general practitioner, a dentist, or a physical therapist) requiring far lower investments and 
a much lighter regulatory burden. Finally, the behaviour of the undertaking concerned is 
relevant as well: if it is in a position to impose unilaterally profi table price increases that 
may constitute important proof of the existence of a dominant position.
When it comes to abusive behaviour, two main types of such behaviour are gener-
ally distinguished: exploitation and exclusion. Exploitation may concern charging exces-
sive prices (many times higher than costs and/or comparable prices59) with respect to 
consumers or other customers and has as its purpose to increase the profi ts of the 
undertaking enjoying a dominant position above competitive levels. Exclusion may con-
cern predatory pricing (below costs60) or a price squeeze (not leaving a margin between 
consumer prices and the prices for key inputs61) and aims to foreclose competition 
by pushing competitors out of the market, thereby creating the opportunity to subse-
quently exploit consumers (then deprived from alternatives). In recent years, antitrust 
enforcers have generally given combating exclusionary abuses priority over correcting 
exploitative abuses. Accordingly, the European Commission (EC) has published exten-
sive Guidance on its approach to exclusion in a communication at the end of 2008.62 
The reason behind this approach is that if exclusion is controlled effectively it will soon 
become superfl uous to address exploitation because the latter problem will be solved by 
the market mechanism itself. In this context, ensuring that effective market entry is not 
foreclosed is important as well.
law. See the Decision of the Dutch NCA in Case 1165, ANOZ-ANOVA/ZAO of 29 Dec. 1998 and the Decision in Case 
882/44, Amicon and Case 407/49, Texincare & Tevic v. Amicon of 18 Jun. 1999.
57 See the Decision of the Dutch NCA in Case 347, Complaints of Healthcare Providers with Regard to Abusive Behaviour 
of Health Insurers of 26 May 2005.
58 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, para. 60. With reference to Case 85/76, 
Hoffmann-La Roche, above n. 50, para. 41: ‘(…) the view may legitimately be taken that very large shares are in themselves, 
and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position’.
59 Such cases are highly exceptional at the EU level. One such exception is provided by Joined Cases 110/88, 
241/88 and 242/88, François Lucazeau et al. v. Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) et al. [1989] 
ECR 2811.
60 Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom SA v. Commission [2009] ECR I-2369.
61 Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477.
62 See Press Release IP/08/1877 of 3 Dec. 2008, ‘consumer welfare at heart of Commission fi ght against abuses by 
dominant undertakings’. In the fi rst half of 2009, this new Commission policy was published in the OJ. See Communica-
tion from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Art. 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009, C45/7.
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Interestingly, in its Guidance, the Commission has indicated that reasons external to 
a dominant undertaking may be capable of justifying abusive behaviour: the Commission 
has expressed its intention to apply an objective necessity test to cases of dominance. 
The Guidance even explicitly states that ‘(e)xclusionary conduct may, for example, be 
considered objectively necessary for health or safety reasons related to the nature of 
the product in question’.63 At fi rst sight, the term ‘health or safety reasons’ seems to 
relate to product safety. However, because the Commission does not explicitly limit the 
interpretation of ‘health or safety’ to that context it cannot be excluded that health-care 
interests other than those connected with product safety are capable of justifying abusive 
behaviour.64 In any event, the Commission appears prepared to accept that the need to 
realize an objective of general interest may justify practices that, at fi rst sight, seem to 
be of an abusive nature. Hence, the Commission’s Guidance on exclusionary behaviour 
may have opened the door to invoking the objective of health care in order to justify a 
breach of Article 102 TFEU.
4.2. Article 102 TFEU cases on health care
The analysis above makes clear that applying the general rules on dominance as devel-
oped in European competition law to health care may turn out to be problematic. 
How did the case law solve these diffi culties? In particular, how does it make use of the 
exception regarding SGEI in Article 106(2) TFEU, which balances the application of the 
competition rules with the requirements of public interest tasks?
To date, the Commission has not acted against abuse of dominance with regard to 
health-care providers or insurers. However, in recent years, it has taken action on several 
occasions in the pharmaceuticals sector, notably IMS Health65 and AstraZeneca.66 IMS 
Health, however, did not raise major health-care-specifi c issues but instead focused on 
the (complex) relationship between IP rights and competition law. AstraZeneca manipu-
lated the renewal procedures of its authorizations to the detriment of competing produc-
ers of generic substitutes as well as the shape in which its products were marketed to 
the detriment of parallel importers. However, the Commission decision did not lead to 
any guidance on the complex interplay between health care and competition law. Apart 
63 Ibid., para. 29 (Guidance).
64 Although admittedly the Commission refers to cases where product-related conditions were involved: Case 
T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1439, paras 118–119; Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commis-
sion (Tetra Pak II) [1994] ECR II-755.
65 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG [2004] ECR I-5039. The 
Court decided that the owner of an the essential input is obligated to supply it if the undertaking that has requested a license 
intends to use this to create a new product, if there is no objective justifi cation for the refusal, and if the refusal eliminates 
all competition from the market. An interim measure was imposed in 2003/741/EC: Commission Decision of 13 Aug. 
2003 relating to a proceeding under Art. 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP D3/38.044, NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim 
Measures), OJ 2003, L268/69.
66 See 2006/857/EC: Decision of the Commission of 15 Jun. 2005 relating to a proceeding under Art. 82 of the EC 
Treaty and Art. 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/A.37.507/F3, AstraZeneca), OJ 2006, L332/24. This was in line 
with the norm established by the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefi s Eireann (RTE) 
and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743, which was relaxed by the General Court 
in Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission [2007] ECR II-3601.
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from this, the Court has delivered a judgment in a preliminary procedure concerning the 
application of Article 102 TFEU with regard to pharmaceuticals, which we will discuss 
in more detail as it raised some issues of principle.
In Sot. Lélos v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, the question was raised as to what extent a 
pharmaceutical company was allowed to defend itself against parallel imports (arbitrage 
between ‘high price’ and ‘low price’ Member States) by means of a refusal to supply.67 
One of the issues raised in this case was that the dominant company concerned pursued 
a health-care objective, that is, guaranteeing the access to medicines for all. The ECJ took 
the position that regulation of pharmaceuticals does not remove the abusive character 
from every refusal by a pharmaceutical undertaking to fulfi l the orders from wholesale 
traders that are involved in parallel exports. However, it should be able to take reasonable 
and proportionate measures to defend its own commercial interests.68 In this context, 
the usual size of these orders given the size of the market involved and earlier com-
mercial relations between the parties should be taken into account. Hence, a measured 
response to parallel imports appears possible. Of great interest, however, is the decision 
the ECJ took in the Sot. Lelos case, with regard to the claim by the dominant fi rms that 
the contested measures were required in order to protect the planning and distribution 
of medicines in Greece.
The ECJ rejected this claim. After having taking into consideration the problems of 
shortage of medicines, it explicitly stated that:
(…) it would not be for the undertakings holding a dominant position but for the national 
authorities to resolve the situation, by taking appropriate and proportionate steps that were con-
sistent with (…) the applicable national and EU laws.69
Hence, it may be concluded that the ECJ rejects the idea that the pursuit of health-
care objectives may justify refusal to supply. This approach does not square with the 
Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 TFEU mentioned in the previous section. As 
the ECJ did not explain its position further, it is hard to understand why it did not opt 
for merely concluding that the claim of the undertaking concerned was not suffi ciently 
supported by proof. The result appears to suggest tensions between EU case law in a 
preliminary ruling – hence, advising in national proceedings – and the Commission’s 
Guidance on a signifi cant issue, that is, to what extent practices of dominant undertak-
ings may be justifi able due to the need to pursue legitimate health-care aims.
The analysis in Sot. Lélos v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE illustrates that there is cur-
rently no clear view on how to apply Article 102 TFEU to health-care cases. Whereas 
the Commission seems to leave the door open to health-care-specifi c considerations 
in this context, the ECJ appears to reject the idea that health-care cases require special 
 treatment. Consequently, EU competition policy on dominance abuse in health care is 
in a state of fl ux, and as a result, insuffi cient guidance is available.
67 Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE et al. v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE [2008] ECR I-7139.
68 Ibid., paras 69–70.
69 See para. 75 of Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE, above n. 67.
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Nevertheless, there are two cases involving dominance issues where the ECJ has 
been willing to take into account health-care-specifi c objectives. Both have already been 
mentioned in the context of defi ning an ‘undertaking’, and both concern the application 
of the SGEI exception.
In Ambulanz Glöckner, Article 102 TFEU was applied in conjunction with Article 
106 TFEU to ambulance services. The policy of the authorities to allow public ambu-
lance companies to leverage their market power from the reserved market (the emer-
gency transport of patients) to the market that was nominally open to competition (the 
non-emergency transport of patients) was found to be anticompetitive. However, the 
ECJ held that these companies were entrusted with the task of providing SGEI within 
the meaning of Article 106(2) TFEU. As a result, it was accepted that the performance of 
this task needed to be fi nanced by the revenues gained on the non-reserved market, in 
order to prevent the operation of the SGEI mission on the reserved market, the universal 
coverage of the emergency transport of ill people, from being put under pressure. The 
health-care-specifi c objectives of the SGEI mission, thus, played an overriding role.
Similarly, in AG2R Prévoyance, the ECJ held that the provident society charged with 
the task of managing the supplementary health-care scheme by the social partners who 
had set up this scheme was entrusted with carrying out an SGEI in the sense of Article 
106(2) TFEU. The compulsory affi liation to this managing body was justifi ed due to 
this SGEI as it would ensure that universal cover was provided and that the undertak-
ing entrusted with the task of providing supplementary insurance for all persons insured 
would not end up with an increasing share of bad risks: hence, the compulsory affi liation 
guaranteed that the managing body concerned was able to carry out its SGEI task under 
economically acceptable circumstances. As in Glöckner, the concept of SGEI led the ECJ 
to accommodate health-care-specifi c concerns in its reasoning.
However, it is noteworthy that in AG2R Prévoyance the ECJ did not assign any 
value to the act of entrustment of the imputed SGEI. It merely derived the relevant task 
from the fact that the supplementary health-care scheme at issue was characterized by a 
high degree of solidarity.70 Furthermore, the ECJ pointed to the constraints imposed on 
AG2R and related to the continuity of the cover granted to the persons insured. This 
approach is a striking departure from earlier cases where the EU Courts have gone to 
some trouble in order to identify the legal context from which the existence of SGEI 
could be derived.71 In AG2R, it seems that in the view of the ECJ the mere existence 
of obligations (related to a general interest) imposed upon a managing body suffi ces to 
assume that this body is engaged in providing SGEI. Moreover, in this particular case, the 
entities, which decided on the designation of the management of the scheme concerned, 
were social partners, that is, the employers and trade unions representing employees in 
70 Fixed-rate contributions not proportionate to the risks insured, contributions fi xed at a uniform sum, partly paid 
by the employer and partly by the employee, without any role for factors such as age or health.
71 For example, Case T-289/03, British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA) et al. v. Commission [2008] 
ECR II-81.
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the traditional bakery sector. Although French legislation provides that collective bar-
gaining agreements may be imposed by law on an entire sector, French law does not 
oblige the social partners to arrange for supplementary health-care schemes. Hence, the 
mission to provide these insurance services originated with the private entities con-
cerned and not from the state.72
In other words, the ECJ seems to accept that SGEI missions can be derived from 
general obligations laid down in private collective agreements. In this regard, it should be 
noted that the social partners must enter into negotiations with the provident organiza-
tion that will be assigned with the task of administering the health insurance scheme 
concerned, in order to discuss implementation matters and details. Hence, these negotia-
tions allow this provident organization to infl uence of what its eventual SGEI mission 
will consist. There is a stark contrast here with judgments delivered in cases where SGEI 
did not a play a role. In these cases, such as Sot. Lélos, the ECJ fi rmly rejected the idea 
that private parties could be engaged in public interest policies. It is hard to reconcile 
these two lines in the case law.
In sum, we have seen that the application of Article 102 TFEU based on the stan-
dard SSNIP methodology has some health-care-specifi c problems. At the same time, the 
Commission’s new general focus on exclusionary abuse is accompanied by a possible 
opening for allowing health-care-specifi c concerns to be taken on board. However, the 
Sot. Lélos case law suggests that this line has not (yet) been adopted by the Court. So far, 
the main solution for reconciling health-care interests with competition law is found in 
the application of the SGEI concept. The AG2R ruling appears to extend the scope of 
SGEI beyond the public domain. However, under such a fl exible and broad approach, 
it is very diffi cult to draw a clear line between undertakings that are entrusted with an 
SGEI mission and undertakings that are not. We hope that the Court of Justice will soon 
clarify which conditions an act of entrustment within the meaning of Article 106(2) 
TFEU must fulfi l.73 This is of special importance given the linkages between national 
and EU competition laws.
5.  The Relationship between the EU Competition Rules 
and National Rules
NCAs are increasingly called upon to apply competition rules (based on European law) 
to health-care cases. Hence, it is important to explore how national competition rules 
relate to European competition rules. This section will address this relationship insofar 
72 Likewise, in Case C-67/96, Albany; Joined Cases C-115/97 to C-117/97, Brentjes; and Case C-219/97, Drijvende 
Bokken, above n. 15, the ECJ seemed to have accepted that an SGEI mission may be designated by social partners. At issue 
in these cases were supplementary pension schemes. The provision of such a scheme by a particular pension fund was sup-
posed to constitute an SGEI.
73 Including the impact of Protocol on Services of General Interest to be annexed to the TEU, to the TFEU, and, 
where applicable, to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ 2007 C306/148.
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as this is relevant for health-care cases. This analysis will mainly concern the effet utile 
(or useful effect) as well as the CIF case law and the question of when public involve-
ment in the markets protects the undertakings to which it applies from the competition 
rules (the ‘state action doctrine’). The powers of NCAs with regard to the EU competi-
tion rules will also be addressed briefl y.
5.1. National and EU competition laws
All EU Member States now have NCAs, which are empowered and obliged to apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in cases where trade between the Member States may be 
affected.74 In such cases, the Commission must be notifi ed and may itself take control of 
the case at any point where it believes this is warranted.75 The NCAs are also members of 
the so-called network of EU competition authorities (Electronic Communications Net-
work (ECN)) that is coordinated by the EC. These are the results of the modernization 
of EU antitrust based on Regulation 1/2003,76 which combines rationalization (a greater 
emphasis on economic reasoning) and prioritization (more emphasis on hard-core car-
tels) with systemic reform based on a combination of decentralization and coordination. 
Meanwhile, all Member States have also adopted national competition laws, which are 
often carbon copies of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (a process called spontaneous harmo-
nization). According to Regulation 1/2003, these national rules may not be stricter than 
the EU rules if an effect on trade is present, unless they apply to unilateral conduct.77 
Hence, the NCAs have to apply both European competition law and national competi-
tion rules inspired by their TFEU equivalents.
It is apparent that due to the ECJ’s settled case law on the concept of undertak-
ing the door is wide open for applying competition law to health-care cases. This is a 
signifi cant fi nding for the NCAs, since they are obliged to interpret the concept of an 
undertaking in the light of this case law. This is not only true for Article 101 and Article 
102 TFEU cases but also in matters involving the national competition rules. After all, 
these national rules are modelled in line with EU competition law, which implies that 
the national concept of undertaking is identical to the one developed in the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence. As the majority of the health-care cases are of a national or sub-national 
nature, the NCAs are required to apply the broad concept of undertaking and, as a result, 
to develop health-care-specifi c approaches to competition law.
74 Articles 3 and 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, above n. 6.
75 Ibid., Arts 11 and 12. Cf. Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 
OJ 2004, C101/43. Amicus curiae interventions by the Commission in national court proceedings are also foreseen: Com-
mission Notice on the Cooperation between the Commission and the Courts of the EU Member States in the application 
of Arts 81 and 82 EC, OJ 2004, C101/54.
76 See above n. 6.
77 Ibid., Art. 3(2).
 TAKING THE TEMPERATURE 235
5.2. Guidance
As was already mentioned, the EC is at the centre of the network of national regula-
tors (ECN) and can trump the procedures of the NCAs by taking over in important 
cases or in cases where its views diverge significantly from that of the NCA involved. 
Policy convergence is actively promoted within the ECN. At the same time, under-
takings have to perform self-evaluation of their agreements and national courts may 
be called upon to decide issues of EU competition law. Consequently, the Commis-
sion has taken upon itself to provide extensive and regularly updated guidance on 
such issues as vertical and horizontal restraints and exclusionary abuses.78 On vertical 
and horizontal mergers (even though these are not covered by the modernization of 
antitrust), the Commission has likewise issued detailed explanatory communications.79 
Market definition has also been the subject of a 1997 Commission Notice, albeit by 
now arguably outdated.80
So far, sectoral guidance remains relatively rare and, where it exists, is not always 
kept up to date,81 albeit with the signifi cant recent exceptions of distribution agreements 
in the automobile industry82 and regarding the insurance industry.83 Other exceptions are 
the liberalized network sectors such as electronic communications where during the ini-
tial liberalization phase and the transition period more guidance tends to be provided.84 
In any event, apart from the general guidance just mentioned, there is no specifi c guid-
ance available to NCAs applying the EU competition rules to the health-care sector, 
even while the broad application of the concept of undertaking opens previously shel-
tered fi eld up to application of the competition rules. Likewise in the state aid fi eld – 
where by contrast there is a wide range of sectoral guidance documents85 – the 
 Commission does not provide specifi cs for health care.
78 Communication from the Commission – Notice – Guidelines on the application of Art. 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ 
2004, C101/97; Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 Apr. 2010 on the application of Art. 101(3) of the TFEU to 
categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ 2010, L102/1; Commission Notice – Guidelines on vertical 
restraints, OJ 2010, C130/1; Commission Notice – Guidelines on the applicability of Art. 101 of the Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements, OJ 2011, C11/1; Guidance on enforcement against exclusionary conduct, above n. 62.
79 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concen-
trations between undertakings, OJ 2008, C265/6; Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ 2004, C31/5.
80 Notice on market defi nition, above n. 51.
81 For example, Notice from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to the postal sector and 
on the assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services, OJ 1998, C39/2.
82 Commission Regulation (EU) 461/2010 on the application of Art. 101(3) of the TFEU to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector, OJ 2010, L129/52.
83 Commission Regulation (EC) of 24 Mar. 2010 on the application of Art. 101(3) of the Treaty to certain categories 
of agreements, decisions, and concerted practices in the insurance sector, OJ 2010, L83/1.
84 Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of signifi cant market power under the Community 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ 2002, C165/6; Notice on the application 
of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector – framework, relevant markets, and prin-
ciples, OJ 1998, C265/2; Guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector, OJ 
1991, C233/2.
85 With (sometime multiple) separate documents covering agriculture, audiovisual production, broadband broad-
casting, the coal industry, electricity, fi nancial services, fi sheries, postal services, shipbuilding, steel, synthetic fi bres, and 
transport.
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5.3. EFFET UTILE
Given the degree of government involvement in health care, the effet utile (useful effect) 
case law is relevant. This is the case law that demonstrates that Member States may 
infringe their duty of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) if a Member State by means of its regulation requires or encourages the 
adoption of agreements, decisions, or concerted practices contrary to Article 101 TFEU 
or reinforces their effects, or where it divests its own rules of the character of legislation 
by delegating to private economic operators responsibility for taking decisions affecting 
the economic sphere.86 The corollary of this doctrine is that if collusive behaviour is 
imposed on undertakings by public authorities, the private parties concerned accord-
ingly escape liability under the competition rules (i.e., they may invoke a ‘state action 
defence’), unless they had suffi cient margin of freedom to engage in some competition 
but snuffed this out at their own initiative.87
In the Belgian Doulamis case in 2008, the Court held that a law prohibiting adver-
tising by dentists did not involve a breach of the effet utile of the competition rules 
because a direct link with private restraints of competition could not be shown.88 This 
Belgian case shows – in line with settled case law89 – that for the useful effect doc-
trine to be applicable a link should exist between, on the one hand, the restrictive state 
measures at hand and, on the other hand, particular practices of undertakings. In other 
Member States, such as the Netherlands, tariff setting based on agreements between the 
government and bodies of medical practitioners may be vulnerable to the effet utile rule if 
restrictive agreements between the practitioners are promoted by the government in the 
process. After all, in the light of the useful effect doctrine, it is questionable whether tariff 
agreements concluded between undertakings are compatible with EU competition law 
(insofar as they affect the trade between Member States). The limits of what may be per-
missible are set out in the Arduino (2002) and Cipolla (2006) cases on the remuneration of 
Italian lawyers.90 These cases show that apart from the possibility for public authorities to 
intervene ex ante (before a particular measure is taken) in the general interest it must be 
possible for public authorities to take a decision in place of the one proposed by market 
parties as well (e.g., for judges to adjust rates at a later stage).
5.4. The direct effect of the doctrine of EFFET UTILE
It is common ground that the EU competition rules have direct effect. This means that 
they can be invoked by citizens before national courts. In addition, as already mentioned 
86 Case 267/86, Pascal Van Eycke v. ASPA [1988] ECR 4769.
87 Joined Cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P, Commission and France v. Ladbroke Racing Ltd. [1997] ECR I-6265.
88 Case C-446/05, Doulamis, above n. 35.
89 See, e.g., C-245/91, Criminal Proceedings against Ohra Schadeverzekeringen NV [1993] I-5851 and Case C-2/91, 
Criminal Proceedings against Wolf W. Meng [1993] I-5751.
90 Case C-35/99, Criminal Proceedings against Manuele Arduino [2002] ECR I-1529; Joined Cases C-94/04 and 
C-202/04, Federico Cipolla against Rosaria Portolese and Stefano Macrino and Claudia Capoparte against Roberto Meloni [2006] 
ECR I-11421.
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above, the NCAs are obliged to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at the national level 
in cases that have a European dimension.91 Application of EU provisions having direct 
effect by public bodies is in fact inherent in the concept of direct effect.
The 2003 CIF case is relevant here as it creates a supplementary responsibil-
ity under EU law for NCAs as well as (arguably) other national regulators.92 In the 
1989 Fratelli Costanzo case, the Court had already decided that all public bodies, not 
only domestic courts but also national administrative authorities, such as municipali-
ties, were obliged to apply provisions of European law having direct effect and to set 
aside those national (legislative) rules that were at odds with these EU provisions.93 
In CIF, this was confirmed with regard to the useful effect doctrine discussed above, 
which means that the undertakings that had so far been protected by the state action 
doctrine would, henceforth, become liable under EU competition law (albeit not for 
the period preceding intervention by the NCA). It remains an open question whether 
this obligation only rests with the national authorities (the NCAs) that have powers to 
apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU or whether also other authorities such as health-care 
regulators have the authority and, as a result, the duty to take action against national 
measures that are in violation of Article 4(3) TEU in conjunction with Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU.
In any event, it is clear that on the basis of the useful effect doctrine NCAs may set 
aside national health-care interventions that are of a mixed public-private nature. This 
possibility raises concerns as EU law provides insuffi cient guidance on whether and to 
what extent health-care objectives are accommodated in the application of European 
competition law. An NCA and a national health-care body that is (partly) of a private 
nature but also legitimized by public law may be involved in a dispute on the compatibil-
ity of a particular national measure with European competition law. An example could 
be collectively negotiated doctor’s rates (which is dubious as doctors are, in principle, 
undertakings) backed up by a related public adjustment of hospital budgets with a view 
to containing overall costs. Because the case law of the ECJ and the General Court 
and the decisional practice of the Commission do not clearly address competition law 
and health-care, it remains uncertain how such a dispute should be settled, that is, EU 
law does not clearly instruct domestic courts that may have to rule on such disputes. 
The latter may then make a preliminary reference, raising the entire discussion to the 
EU level and coincidentally contributing to the de facto emergence of EU health-care 
91 Regulation 1/2003, above n. 6, Art. 3(1): ‘Where the competition authorities of the Member States or national 
courts apply national competition law to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices 
within the meaning of Art. 81(1) of the Treaty which may affect trade between Member States within the meaning of that 
provision, they shall also apply Art. 81 of the Treaty to such agreements, decisions or concerted practices. Where the com-
petition authorities of the Member States or national courts apply national competition law to any abuse prohibited by Art. 
82 of the Treaty, they shall also apply Art. 82 of the Treaty.’
92 Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato [2003] ECR 
I-8055.
93 Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo Spa v. Comune di Milano en Impresa Ing. Lodigani Spa [1989] ECR 1839.
238 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
law – despite the ban on harmonization in this fi eld.94 However, the emergence of such 
an approach depends on the willingness of national courts to address preliminary ques-
tions to the ECJ.
6. Conclusion
Above, EU competition law as applied to health-care cases has been analysed. The main 
question was whether EU institutions accommodate health-care-specifi c concerns in 
the way they apply the Treaty provisions on competition to health care. Likewise in 
question was whether this view was suffi ciently clear to allow its application by national 
authorities.
While addressing these questions, we have found that the case law on the appli-
cability of competition law has paved the way for EU involvement in health-care. 
This is the first, formal, step: the Commission and the European courts may assess all 
kinds of health-care practices in the light of competition. On this count, it should be 
concluded that the European courts and the Commission have construed the con-
cept of undertaking expansively. Cases such as Pavlov and Glöckner suggest that most 
providers of health-care are caught by the competition rules because they provide 
(economic) services (potentially) in competition. Furthermore, AOK and FENIN, as 
well as more recently AG2R, show that bodies managing health-care schemes fall 
within the ambit of the European competition law as well, insofar as their schemes 
are based on a mix of solidarity and competition. In contrast, if these schemes are 
predominately based on solidarity and are subject to substantial supervision by the 
state, competition law does not apply. However, the precise lines of demarcation are 
not easy to draw, and these cases remain difficult to square with some of the other 
case law. In any event, health-care-specific concerns play an important role in the 
case law on the concept of undertaking, as solidarity is one of the values taken into 
account in this case law.
However, what about the second, substantive, step: how do the EU institutions apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to concrete health-care cases? Here, the answer to the ques-
tion of whether there is a health-care-specifi c application of the competition rules is that 
no coherent view exists nor does a general exception from application of the competition 
rules. In this context, it is striking that the ECJ is prepared to pay due consideration to 
legitimate interests in cases concerning, for example, sports and the professional ethics of 
lawyers but has not extended this approach to health-care. In cases like GlaxoSmithKline 
and Sot. Lelos, no specifi c awareness of the health-care dimension was evident, while the 
facts of these cases (e.g., the role of health insurers) and the persistence of the problems 
of parallel imports of pharmaceuticals and public intervention in pharmaceutical pricing 
94 Cf Art. 168, para. 7 TFEU as well as Art. 6 sub(a) TFEU and Art. 2, para. 5 TFEU, which jointly explicitly make 
clear that the harmonization of laws in this area is excluded. This notwithstanding a Directive on patients’ rights in cross-
border health care has recently been adopted by European Parliament and Council, above n. 2.
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would have been pertinent. Nevertheless, in individual health-care cases such as Glöckner 
and AG2R, exceptions were successfully invoked, notably that for SGEI – albeit with a 
lack of clarity, for example, on what constitutes entrustment and to what extent SGEI 
can be defi ned by private parties.
Altogether this appears to mean that health-care providers, insurers, and managing 
bodies can benefi t from an (albeit so far ill-defi ned) margin of autonomy with respect 
to the competition rules, which is broadly conditioned by the answers to questions of 
whether benefi ts are fi xed in national legislation, whether signifi cant public supervision 
is involved, and whether restrictions on competition are necessary to enable the func-
tioning of an SGEI, that is, the degree of explicit state involvement codetermines the 
scope for independent behaviour and, hence, for application of the competition regime 
(as in a state action doctrine).
Turning to the question regarding the clarity required for action at the national 
level, the combination of this expansive interpretation of the concept of undertaking in 
EU law and the decentralization of the application of EU competition policy are likely 
to require many NCAs to apply EU competition law to health-care cases.95 National 
courts will also be confronted more frequently with questions involving EU competition 
law and undertakings must make self-assessments whether the legal exemption from the 
cartel prohibition of Article 101(3) TFEU applies. Unfortunately, however, due to the 
absence of a comprehensive and coherent view on the application of European com-
petition law to health care, there is scant guidance from the EU level when it comes to 
concrete issues of antitrust control. The problem is that the Commission and the Euro-
pean courts may not get the opportunity to provide more clarity in concrete cases in 
the near future. With the partial exception of pharmaceuticals, the health-care sector in 
the EU (both insurance and provision) remains composed of tightly regulated national 
enclaves with limited cross-border activity. Hence, the Commission and, in its slipstream, 
the European courts will only come into action occasionally – and have also few incen-
tives to do so, given the political sensitivity of the sector.
The NCAs and national courts, however, are less able to avoid ruling in health-care 
cases that are at the margin of being EU relevant (requiring appreciable effects on com-
petition and on trade). This means that a fair chance exists that they will come up with 
their own interpretations and approaches and, as a result, will create a ‘Euro-national’ 
competition law for health care that may well be fragmented across the different Mem-
ber States. This development may fi t in with the view of European law as a multilayered 
95 A fi rst account of decisions taken by NCAs in health-care cases can be found in Lear et al., above n. 17. For 
another recent overview, see A. Taylor et al., ‘Healthcare and Competition Law: An Emerging Area – Overview of Cases 
by European National Competition Authorities’, E-Competitions, Special Healthcare Issue (January 2011). Moreover, as was 
already outlined above, the approach taken by the Union Courts in Case C-205/03, FENIN, above n. 20 and the preceding 
Case T-319/99, FENIN [2003] ECR II-357 towards buying power in health care and the concept of undertaking signifi -
cantly differs from the decisional practice of many NCAs that preceded the FENIN judgments. Monographs on individual 
Member States are also emerging, e.g., T. Lubbig & M. Klasse, Kartellrecht im Pharma- und Gesundheitssektor (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2007) for Germany and D. Fornaciari, S. Callens & E. Schokkaert, Ziekenhuizen, mededingingsrecht en recht op 
kwaliteitsvolle zorg (Antwerp: Intersentia 2010) for Belgium.
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legal order. Preliminary references may provide a lifeline for the coherence of EU law. 
However, so far the preliminary reference procedure has not delivered what it is sup-
posed to do: guaranteeing the uniform application of the Treaty provisions to health-care. 
Moreover, we are convinced that the EU and its Member States should not be satisfi ed 
with the current way competition law is shaping health care.
The following problems need to be solved:
(1) First, the application of the Euro-national competition rules for health care 
is vulnerable to unexpected changes in law. As the AOK case law had made 
clear, as soon as the ECJ comes up with a decision that deviates from long-
standing national practices, NCAs must immediately change their policy. This 
is damaging to the reputation of an NCA and bad for legal certainty. The law 
must be more predictable.
(2) Second, NCAs risk developing diverging sets of Euro-national competition 
rules for health care. This seems inevitable, as these national authorities must 
work out EU competition law, which largely consists of open norms and 
concepts, in widely different settings. As a result, what is permissible in one 
Member State may be forbidden in another. Such a development would 
obviously interfere with the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market. Hence, the recent progress made in free movement law could be 
jeopardized by divergence in EU competition law.
How can these problems be solved? We are not pleading for the European leg-
islature to enact hard law harmonization measures, even if such a development were 
conceivable. However, we do believe that the EU level should take charge of shaping 
the basic tenets of the Euro-national competition rules for health care and the devel-
opment of the resulting multilayer model in competition and health care. Hence, the 
Commission should develop a coherent approach towards competition law and health 
care, in close cooperation with the NCAs. The framework of the ECN seems suitable 
for such discussions, which could culminate in soft law documents such as guidelines 
or communications. Key points to be addressed in these documents are related to the 
role of the ‘legitimate objectives’ case law in Wouters and Meca-Medina in health care. 
Furthermore, they should examine the role that SGEI could play, as the ECJ’s case law 
has shown both that this concept is capable of reconciling the EU competition rules 
with health-care objectives (allowing for mixed systems with a controlled degree of 
reliance on the market and on private operators) and that the exact contours of this 
concept remain hard to grasp. This concerns, for instance, the degree to which SGEI 
can be defi ned and/or entrusted by private parties and, hence, when the exemption 
can be invoked. The practical implications of this are considerable. Here too, therefore, 
clarifi cation on how to apply key competition concepts in the health-care context is 
required.
Hence, EU competition law will have to show that it is equal to the challenge 
of offering the health-care sector a comprehensive and coherent competition law 
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framework. This is all the more important as Member States are trying out varying 
degrees of market-based reform in this sector. It is also important because for similar 
reasons other pillars of the welfare state such as education, social services, and pensions 
are likely to be more affected by the EU competition rules in the near future. Therefore, 
the lessons learned from the application of competition law in health care are essential 
in order to meet the challenges imposed by market-based changes in the functioning of 
the European welfare states at large.
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